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"The  wonder of  wonders, that consciousness is." 
(Edmund Husserl) 
"The  I, the I, is what is deeply mysterious." 
(Ludwig Wittgenstein) 
Philosophers, whether phenomenologically or analytically oriented, share 
an interest in the ontological status of the human self and its relation to the 
world. Followers of Husserl have attempted to formulate a conception of 
the self as an embodied consciousness, something between a contingent, 
empirical ego that is just one phenomenon within the world and a pure 
transcendental ego that constitutes the world and is the source of its 
meaning. In Merleau-Ponty's terms: 
The question is that of man's  relationship to his natural or social surroundings. There are two 
classical views: one treats man as the result of  the physical, physiological, and sociological 
influences which shape him from the outside and make him one thing among many; the other 
consists of  recognizing an a-cosmic freedom in him, insofar as he is spirit and represents to 
himself the very causes which supposedly act upon him. On the one hand, man is a part of the 
world; on the other, he is the constituting consciousness of  the world. Neither view is 
satisfactory. ' 
Though phenomenologists who have been interested in Wittgenstein have 
generally concentrated on his later works, his early treatment of the 
"willing subject" parallels in important respects their own attempts to 
conceive of a self that is neither wholly a part of the world nor entirely 
apart from it. Analytically oriented philosophers who interpret 
Wittgenstein have paid little attention to his willing self, perhaps because it 
imposes experiental requirements that are not met by Wittgenstein's own 
formal ontology. In this essay I claim that Wittgenstein's notion of the 
willing subject suggests the need for a conception of the human self as 
neither a purely worldly datum nor a timeless, transcendental ego. And I 
will show that to accommodate such an entity, the ontological categories of 
the Tractatus must be expanded to include a temporal, experiental dimen- 
sion. 
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In the Tractatus Wittgenstein presents an ontology that divides broadly 
into what determines the world from within and what constitutes the world 
from without, contingent facts and necessary form. But neither of these 
categories can account for human action and moral experience as 
Wittgenstein himself conceives them. The possibility of ethics rests with the 
existence of a willing subject (5.8.16, 21.7.16). 2 While the Tractatus, 
consistent with its ontology, makes possible only two views of the willing 
subject, the Notebooks provides a more explicit discussion of each of these 
alternatives as well as criteria which an adequate conception of a willing 
subject must fulfill. The critical requirement is one that the ontology of the 
Tractatus cannot meet: the willing subject must be distinguished both from 
the psychological phenomenon of willing (see 6.423) and from the thinking 
subject (5.18.6); that is, from the metaphysical subject which Wittgenstein 
associates with God (see 8.7.16 and 17.10.16). 3 The formulation of a non- 
psychological willing subject distinct from the self as "godhead" will be 
needed to understand Wittgenstein's significant ethical position that: (a) 
happiness is "...doing the will of God," and (b) happiness and unhappiness 
are genuine alternatives (8.7.16). 
In the Tractatus the willing subject is presented either as a psychol-ogical 
phenomenon or as indistinct from the thinking subject. At 6.373-6.374 the 
will of which the world is independent is reduced to wishes so that "my 
willing x" is itself one momentary fact which in no way implies "x , "  
another fact. The independence of will and world is the independence of 
two facts, an illustration of 6.37: "There is no compulsion making one 
thing happen because another has happened." The fulfillment of a wish is 
not the result of exercising causal efficacy but "a  favour granted by fate" 
(6.374), an accidental accompanying of a process with a wish (4.11.16). 
Within the ontology of facts the willing subject appears here as wishes, and 
so conceived "the will as a phenomenon is of interest only to psychology" 
(6.423). 
An earlier reference to the will suggests a non-psychological alternative. 
It begins with a passage comparable to 6.37 above: "There is no possible 
way of making an inference from the existence of one situation to the 
existence of another, entirely different situation" (5.135). The will's 
freedom is then associated with "the impossibility of knowing actions that 
still lie in the future" (5.1362). The shift from talking in terms of things 
happening (6.37) to our making inferences (5.135) is significant. Here the 
will is not considered as a wish, an event in the world preceding the event 
wished. Rather, the will is identified with actions ("willing is acting") 
(4.11.16), and the impossibility of knowing what actions or events lie in the 
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future/s  the impossibility of knowing what will be willed. No distinction is 
made between "future  events" and "future  actions," my future actions, 
because I am indifferently connected to all events. To replace the self of 
wishes we now have a non-psychological self at the limit of the world (see 
5.641), a self which follows from solipsism (5.64). In the Notebooks the 
solipsistic self which makes the world " m y  world" is explicitly seen also to 
make my will the world-will (17.10.16). The willing subject is then the 
source for a//events; " a  stone, the body of a beast, the body of a man, my 
body, all stand on the same level" (12.10.16). The willing subject is so far 
from a fact in the world that it cannot enter the world contingently to will 
any specific thing but necessarily wills all things. As the presupposition of 
the world's existence (2.18.16), the willing subject would be 
indistinguishable from the thinking subject, the world soul (15.10.16), the 
necessary form of the world. Such "acquiescence" to the world-will, the 
agreement of my will with God's, is, of course, Wittgenstein's solution to 
the ethical problem. Our task now is to prepare for the emergence of the 
problem so that to "fol low God's will" can be a genuine prescription, not 
something I must necessarily do. 
Wittgenstein's two-dimensional ontology leaves no room for a willing I. 
Appropriately conceived, the self that acts can be neither a determiner of 
events from within nor a constitutor of events from without. It cannot be 
wishes because wishes are just psychological facts existing at some moment 
in the world. Since facts are independent, there is no efficient causation, no 
causal nexus in time to allow a will to have the efficacy normally attributed 
to it. If  the willing subject cannot be an efficient cause in the world, the 
only alternative for Wittgenstein is to make it a transcendental ground, a 
will common to the whole world without being in the world, part of the 
world's eternal form, the limit of the world, like the metaphysical subject. 
In the Notebooks this conception of the willing subject is discussed at some 
length and is found wanting. There is, first of all, Wittgenstein's general 
insistence on the distinction between the thinking and the willing subject 
and his claim that only the latter exists (5.8.16). There is the notion that the 
will "penetrates the world" (11.6.16). And there is a series of powerful 
considerations in the long entry of 4.11.16 which sustain an earlier 
suggestion that a totally disembodied will may not, in the ordinary sense, 
be a will at all (20.10.16). 
Only a willing subject somehow situated with respect to the world, in a 
way to be elucidated, can meet the requirements for willing set forth in the 
4.11.16 entry: 
1) To will requires knowing that I will. "Otherwise there might arise a 
question as whether it had yet been completely carried out (4.11.16). A 
willing subject as eternal transcendental ground would have no awareness 
of a distinct segment of time in which a will is actualized. 
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2) To will requires an awareness distinct f rom that of  entertaining other 
ideas. If  the metaphysical and willing subject were one, there would be no 
way to make this distinction (4. I I. 16), and it would hold that: "As my idea 
is the world, in the same way my will is the world-will" (17.10.16). 
3) To will requires (a) an object in the world, 
(b) the ability to will different things, 
(c) accounting for the fact that I cannot will 
everything. 
A willing self identical with the solipsistic I, common to the whole world 
(see 15.10.16-17.10.16) - everywhere and nowhere - would not 
distinguish among objects; no object would be more willable than any 
other. 
4) To will requires a feeling of responsibility for the willed movement. 
The transcendental will could feel no particular responsibility for any 
movement except in the indifferent sense in which it is responsible for all 
movement. 
The conclusion to be drawn from these considerations is that the only 
conception of  a willing subject able to meet the necessary requirements is 
that of a situated subject which "fastens on to the world somewhere, and 
does not fasten on to other things" (4.11.16). To distinguish between those 
things I can and cannot will, to avoid the absurdity of holding that a chair 
can directly obey my will, the will must essentially involve relation to a 
body (20.10.16). Given the above selected considerations from the 
Notebooks, this conclusion is inescapable. But Wittgenstein wants to resist 
it: 
For the consideration of willing makes it look as if one part of the world were closer to me 
than another (which would be intolerable). (4.11.16) 
For one part of the world to be "c loser"  to me, I must somehow be in the 
world, which is a possibility already excluded. The willing self cannot be 
either in space and time as facts are or outside all space and time as are 
God, logical form, and the metaphysical subject. The last three are 
identifiable; the willing subject, in contrast, must be individuated to meet 
its requirements. Wittgenstein's inability to find a place for the willing 
subject through his reflections of  4.11.16 leads him to ask, fifteen days 
later, " W h a t  kind of reason is there for the assumption of a willing 
subject?" (my emphasis) and to answer implicitly with another question, 
" Is  not my world adequate for individuation?" Plainly not, for the non- 
psychological self that makes " the  world my world" (5.641) is as much a 
world-spirit as my spirit (see 15.10.16) and is thus, as we have seen, 
" m i n e "  in what is, in this context, only a trivial sense. 
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II 
The key to an acceptable conception of a willing subject is provided by 
several suggestive remarks in the Notebooks. 
" T h e  will is an attitude [Stellungnahme] of  the subject to the world" 
(4.11.16). 
" I  am placed in [the world] like my eye in its visual field" (11.6.16). 
"Only  from the consciousness of  the uniqueness o f  my life arises 
religion - science - a r t "  (1.8.16). 
From these statements a conception of  the willing subject can be 
formulated, one which finds its place in an explicitly temporal ontological 
dimension between that of momentary, atomistic facts and eternal, organic 
form. 
The will as eine Stellungnahme zur the world - an attitude or a place- 
taking, orientation, point of  view, or even " f o o t h o l d "  (4.11.16) - is a will 
which is not inside the world but is nonetheless situated with a "v iew"  that 
can have "one  part of the world.. .closer. . . than another"  and which can 
change that view to "fasten on to the world" at some different place. 
Wittgenstein explicitly ca~'ries out this visual analogy. If  I am placed in the 
world like my eye in its visual field, I cannot then find my self in the world 
(see 20.10.16). The visual analogy can also be used to distinguish the 
willing from the thinking subject. After a consideration of  this same 
analogy at 4.8.16, Wittgenstein continues the following day to deny the 
thinking subject and to affirm the willing subject. The will here is said to 
provide " tha t  centre of the world, which we call the I, and which is the 
bearer of ethics" (5.816). Whereas the metaphysical I identifiable with God 
is not "p laced"  anywhere in space and time, the willing subject has always 
some particular perspective: 
The situation is not simply that I everywhere notice where I see anything, but I also always 
find myself at a particular point of my visual space, so my visual space has as it were a shape. 
(17.10.16) 
The willing subject "shapes"  the world by adopting different 
Stellungnahmen toward it, thereby affecting not its facts but its limits (see 
6.43). In so doing, the willing subject, like ethics itself, is transcendental 
(6.421), the condition for the possibility of  a world, but it is not 
transcendental in the same way as logic. There are no surprises in logic, nor 
for God; the form of the world is unalterable: " I f  all objects are given, 
then at the same time all possible states of affairs are also given" (2.0124). 
For the willing subject, in contrast, all states of  affairs are never given but 
are always in the process o f  being given. 
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So arises " the  consciousness of  the uniqueness o f  m y  l i fe." My life can 
be said to be unique in two ways. First, as a willing subject with a particular 
perspective, I am distinguishable from a world-spirit; the world is my world 
not just because " the  world and life are one"  (5.621) but because, less 
trivially, my life is uniquely situated, shaping the world with its unique 
point of view. I am not co-incident with.the world atemporally; the world is 
not given all at once. Second, my life is unique in that it is not another fact 
in the world but a perspective on facts: in the process of encountering the 
world's states of affairs, I do not become co-incident with any one of them 
in its momentariness but am always aware of  each as a fact among others. 
The uniqueness of this willing self requires an expansion of  an ontology 
formerly consisting only of actual atomistic particulars and one organic 
form. The willing self is not identifiable with the pure possibility of logical 
form or God because it is always "p laced ,"  fastened on to the world 
somewhere (4.11.16), having the world's possibilities actualized "one  at a 
t ime."  Yet the willing self is always more than whatever actuality it 
confronts at the moment because it is aware of that fact as within the 
context of other possible facts. 
III 
Le temps est le sens de la vie (sens" comme on dit le sens d'un 
eours d'eau, le sens d'une phrase, le sens d'une 6toffe, 
le sens de l'odorat). 
Claudel, Art Podtique 
(as quoted by Maurice Merleau-Ponty) 
From the uniquely temporal ontological perspective of  a willing subject, at 
the point where possibilities become actualized, ethics can emerge. Ethics is 
not concerned with consequences of actions in the world (30.7.16); the 
willing self cannot affect the facts (5.7.16). The alternatives are two, 
happiness and unhappiness (8.7.16), and " the  happy life is good, the 
unhappy bad"  (30.7.16). For Wittgenstein happiness consists in 
"fulfilling the purpose of existence" (6.7.16) 
being " in  agreement with the world" (8.7.16) 
"doing the will of G o d "  (8.7.16) 
The willing subject, the bearer of ethics through which good and evil enter 
(2.8.16), can achieve happiness by being in harmony with God, with fate, 
with the world (8.7.16); that is, with the essence of  the world. But what is 
this essence, this fate, with which one should harmonize? It is clearly in 
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some sense the eternal, the world's unalterable form: 
But is it possible for one so to live that life stops being problematic? 
That  one is living in eternity and not in time? (6.7.16) 
Yet it is also the present: 
Only a man who lives not in time but in the present is happy (8.7.16). 
We have seen that the willing subject has no choice but to encounter the 
world in a particular way: the willing subject can avoid neither (a) a 
contingent existence at some moment,  at some place, nor (b) the necessity 
of having the world presented to it as already there, a dependence on an 
"alien will" that actualizes the world in just the way it does, limited by 
logical possibility (see 8.7.16). To live in eternity and in the present is to live 
in an eternal present of  timelessness (6.4311): "Only  a man who lives not in 
time but in the present is happy."  
The willing self confronts both the world of  possibility and of  actuality; 
it is the very point of possibility being actualized. The fate with which it 
should agree can now be seen neither as the atemporal world of  form (with 
which everything necessarily agrees) nor as the momentary particular facts 
it recognizes (with which it cannot agree but must transcend), but instead as 
the particular process of  actualization of  possibility which is the course and 
direction of  the world. The ethical choice for the willing self consists in its 
"way  of looking at things" (see 7.10.16). Wittgenstein contrasts " the  usual 
way of  looking at things" as in the midst of them with the view sub specie 
aeternitatis, with the whole world as background, the thing together with 
the whole of  logical space. The willing subject, we have seen, is never totally 
immersed in actuality; it is always aware of  facts in the context of other 
possible facts. Here Wittgenstein prescribes that the good life is one in 
which the whole of  logical space is seen in each particular thing, the will's 
choice being to see more or less of the world's form in its things. In the next 
day's entry this position is explicitly related to time and again an ethical 
choice is explicated: 
...it is equally possible to take the bare present image as the worthless momentary picture in 
the whole temporal world, and as the true world among shadows. 
Significantly, the will should identify with the whole of  logical space, with 
eternity, but it can do so only by seeing the whole in the particular, eternity 
in the moment.  The will can have no effect on either the facts or the form 
of the world. But though the will cannot change the "sense"  of  any 
particular fact nor the sense (meaning, essence) of  the world as a whole, it 
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can  see e i ther  m o r e  o r  less of the world in each of  the things it confronts 
and so, in that  w a y  make the world wax or wane as a whole by accession or 
loss of  meaning (see 5.7.16). 
The happy life, Wittgenstein says, is one which "renounces the amenities 
of  the wor ld"  (13.8.16), one which masters the world " b y  renouncing any 
influence on happenings" (11.6.16). W e  can now relate this conception of 
the happy life to Wittgenstein's temporal  f ramework.  A willing subject, we 
have seen, cannot be identical with the whole of  logical space as God is, but 
it can view a th ing  as either a thing among things or as the manifestat ion of  
a world (8.10.16). To  the extent that a subject sees things aesthetically as 
the development or "explici t -at ion" of  world-form, it will be less 
concerned with the thing in its specificity, less concerned with the 
particular happenings of  this actual world, and more prepared to live a life 
of  acquiescence to the will of  God. The alternatives to submission to divine 
will are fear and hope: each is a particular attitude of the willing subject to 
fate; that is, to the movement  and direction - the sens  - of the world. At  
the limit the willing subject might be said to renounce willing altogether, to 
approach the divine state of  a purely contemplative subject. Wittgenstein 
speculates: 
But can we conceive a being that isn't capable of Will at all, but only of Idea...? In some sense 
this seems impossible. But if it were possible then there could also be a world without ethics. 
(21.7.16) 
The solution of the ethical problem would be seen in the vanishing of  the 
problem (see 6.17.16). 
In this paper I have tried to demonstrate that  a willing subject is necessary 
for the ethical problem to arise and for human action to be possible. For 
such a self to exist requires an expansion of the ontology of the Trac ta tus  
to include temporal  and experiental elements. Wittgenstein's N o t e b o o k s  
reveals his early attention to a more phenomenological mode of  inquiry, 
and his t reatment of  human  action there deserves to become a topic of  
common  interest to contemporary philosophers of  normally divergent 
orientations. 
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